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We commend David Raumat for his effort to challenge and to test
empirically our theoretical work2 on the "stability of punishment," and
we thank the journal of Ci'minal Law and C0iminology for this opportunity
to respond to his re-analysis and re-interpretation of our work. Much
too often in criminology, and in social science generally, theories tend to
be pursued and tested only by their proposers, whose credibility i neces-
sarily suspect. Useful theory can only develop as a result of test, chal-
lenge, and modification by others. It is in this spirit that we are pleased
to have this opportunity to address Rauma's work.
First, we would like to clarify some aspects of the theory that were
misstated by Rauma. While our "stability of punishment" hypothesis
was certainly stimulated by Durkheim's notions about a constant level
of crime, we do not adopt his suggestion that the level of crime-defined
as the totality of unlawful acts-is stable in society; in fact, there is am-
ple evidence to the contrary. Indeed, in modern societies, even the vol-
ume of reported crime is almost always much greater than the capacity
to respond to all of it. It is the recognition of the inability of society to
* School of Urban and Public Affairs, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa.
** Dep't of Public Administration, Baruch College, City University of New York, New
York, NY.
1 Rauma, Crime and Punishment Reconsidered- Some Comments on Blumstein r Stability of Pnish-
ment Hypothesis, 72J. CRIM. L. & C. 1772 (1981).
2 This work is addressed in three papers in this Journal: Blumstein & Cohen, A Theo7 of
the Stability of Punishment, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 198 (1973); Blumstein, Cohen & Nagin, The
Dynamics of a Homeostatic Punishment Process, 67 J. CRIM. L. & C. 317 (1977); Blumstein &
Moitra, An Analysis of the Time Series of the Imprisonment Rates in the States of the United States, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 376 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as US. States]; additional comments are
contained in Blumstein & Moitra, Growing or Stable Incarceration Rates: A Comment on Cahalans
"Trends in Incarceration in the United States Since 1880"; 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 91 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
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punish all crime that stimulated the notion of "stability of punishment,"
where it is the punished crime, or the total amount ofpunishment delivered
that we hypothesized to be stable. Thus, we hypothesize that when the
"punishment capacity" of a society becomes excessively pressed, that so-
ciety will find ways to accommodate by diminishing or eliminating pun-
ishment for marginally criminal activities.
In his article, Rauma seems to have ignored this underlying con-
ceptual base, and his discussion is dominated by the question of station-
arity of time series. In doing so, he misses the conceptual issues in our
theory. We were thus disappointed that he did not use the opportunity
offered by his re-analysis to extend or challenge the theory. Instead, his
dominant attention was focused on the choice of one or another Auto
regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) time-series model. 3 In
general, as we show below his analyses in no sense invalidated our
choices. Much of his argument, for example, involves the formulation
and estimation of time series models that invoke differencing, from
which he infers non-stationarity of the process models. We show below,
first, that stationarity is not necessary for our theory to hold (ie., a find-
ing of non-stationarity is not necessarily a contradiction), and, second,
that his models using differencing of the time series are not necessarily
time
FIGURE 1
NON-STATIONARY TIME SERIES WITH STABLE MEAN AND
DECREASING VARIANCE
3 For a background on these models, see G. Box & G. JENKINS, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
(1976); R. McCLEARY & R. HAY, JR., APPLIED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (1980).
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more adequate representations of the available data than our alterna-
tive choices of stationary models.
If a series were found to be stationary, then it would certainly be
consistent with our theory. There are, however, some non-stationary
time series that are totally consistent with our theory. It is possible, for
example, for the imprisonment-rate time series to oscillate around a con-
stant mean with decreasing variance, as depicted in Figure 1. Such a
time series is clearly non-stationary (since its variance is changing with
time), but its behavior is consistent with our underlying theoretical con-
struct. On the other hand, a time series that oscillates only slightly
around a significantly increasing or decreasing trend in the imprison-
ment rate, as depicted in Figure 2, is a non-stationary series that does
contradict our theoretical construct.
time
FIGURE 2
NoN-STATIONARY TIME SERIES WITH TREND
Our theory emphasizes the trendlessness of the mean imprisonment
rate and the relatively small magnitude of the fluctuations around that
mean. Thus, while a finding of stationarity might be a sufficient test of
our hypothesis, it is not a necessary test. Indeed, in all of our work we
have focused on testing for the trendlessness of the mean (one very sali-
ent criterion), and for a low coefficient of variation (ie., the ratio of the
standard deviation to the stationary mean). We are much less con-
cerned about the stationarity of the standard deviation, as long as it is
low compared to the mean.
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The choice is not between stationarity and non-stationarity, but
rather between a trendless mean with relatively mild fluctuations and a
strongly trending mean. The level of the time series may change from
time to time, but it fluctuates around a stable mean. The presence of
such fluctuations may require differencing to achieve stationarity when
developing ARIMA or Box-Jenkins type models. However, the presence
of such stochastic non-stationarity does not necessarily imply instability
in our terms. Such differencing was in fact required in modeling Louisi-
ana, even though the imprisonment rate there was found to be
trendless. 4
Even if the more restricive requirement of stationarity were a neces-
sary condition for the theory, Rauma has failed to provide satisfactory
evidence that the U.S. series is in fact non-stationary. Both our original
estimates of a stationary second order autoregressive model (AR2)5 and
Rauma's own estimates of the same model with slightly fewer observa-
tions pass the statistical tests of stationarity. The parameter estimates
are within the constraints for stationarity,6 and the test of the residuals
indicates that they are approximately "white noise" (based on the Q
statistic with p > .05). Even though we do not feel it necessary to insist
on stationarity, his results clearly support our original choice of a statio-
nary model for this data. Thus, even though the test is excessively se-
vere, it still confirms our hypothesis.
Furthermore, Rauma makes much of the fact that he has found a
model of a non-stationary process containing a first difference that ap-
pears rather different from ours, and he argues that his model is "consis-
tent with the data and inconsistent with the stability hypothesis," even
though it [his model] has a "residual mean square error . . .slightly
higher."' 7 While we consider a model derived from theoretical under-
pinning to be inherently far more attractive than one based on "data
fitting," his would be of more interest if it represented a truly different
formulation. It turns out, however, that this "competing" model is ana-
lytically equivalent to ours. In our analysis, we estimated a second order
autoregressive (AR2) model of the following form:
4 Blumstein & Moitra, US States, supra note 2, at 385.
5 The following notation is used in this paper to denote the various time-series types
discussed:
IMA(I,1) is a first-difference, first-order moving average process
ARI(1,1) is a first-difference, first-order autoregressive process
ARMA(1,1) is a first-order autoregressive, first-order moving-average process
AR2 is a second-order autoregressive process
6 The bounds of stationarity of an AR2 model are:
1) -1 < ( 2 < 1, 2) 4'1 + ( 2 < 1, ( 2 - '01 <l' In our model, 4)2 = -0.7, 4), + 42 = 0.84,
and 4 2 - dpI = -2.2, all of which satisfy the constraints.
7 Rauma, supra note 1, at 1783.
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Zt - 4l Z-_ - 42 7- 2 = at (1)
Using Rauma's parameter estimates for this model from his Table 1,8
Equation (1) becomes:
2t - 1.5 2t- 1 + .7 - 2 = a, (2)
Rauma proposes in his Table 29 a first difference (ARI(1,1)) model of
the form:
at
(1-B) Zt = (3)(l-)'1 B)
Letting Z = Z-1, Equation (3) can be re-written as:
(1-4)'1 B)(1-B)7t = a, (4)
or
zt - (1 + 4') Zt_1 + 4' Zt- 2 = a- (5)
which is analytically equivalent to Equation (1). Indeed, (5) is identical
to (1) if 4)= 1 + 4'1, and 42 = -4'V In fact, using Rauma's parameter
estimate from Table 2 of 4)' = .57, we find his first difference model to
be:
Zt - 1.57 2t- 1 + .57 Zt- 2 = at (6)
which is virtually identical to his representation of our second-order
autoregressive model in Equation (2).
Many stationary second order autoregressive processes (AR2) can
be modeled equaly well by a first-difference first-order autoregressive
process (ARI1). In such cases, in addition to satisfying the constraints
for stationarity of an (AR2) model, the parameters must also satisfy the
relation 4) = (1 - 4)2) with 4)2 < 0. Both our own and Rauma's esti-
mates for the United States imprisonment rate series do satisfy the sta-
tionarity constraints and come very close to meeting this last
requirement. It is therefore not difficult to see how this data could be fit
reasonably well by both AR2 and ARI(1,1) models. As demonstrated
by Rauma's estimates of both models, however, neither model clearly
dominates the other. The choice between the two conceptually different
models is a very close call. As a sufficient condition test of the stability
theory under consideration, the stationary AR2 model is immediately
consistent with the stability-of-punishment hypothesis. Rauma's test of
the ARI(1,1) model with a trend parameter further indicates that the
series is trendless and thus consistent with the theory. Thus, Rauma has
built the essence of his argument on a distinction in form with no real
difference in substance.
Because it does attempt to provide some theoretical insight, we
8 Id at 1781.
9 Id at 1782.
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found Rauma's section on "Admission Rates: An Alternative Measure
of Stability" more appealing. 10 But even here, his arguments are not
convincing. He seems to feel that Durkheim's characterization that the
"passionate reaction of graduated intensity that society exercises
through the medium of a body acting upon those of its members who
have violated certain rules of conduct" provides a sufficient basis for
concluding that the act of sentencing to prison must be the appropriate
measure of "punishment" in a stability-of-punishment context, and so
the prison admissions rate is preferable to the imprisonment rate. This
question of the appropriate measure of punishment is an important the-
oretical issue with which we have wrestled in our own considerations. It
is entirely conceivable that in a society where the act of sentencing by
itself represents a profound stigma,1' commitment to prison could well
represent the relevant "stable" measure of punishment. It is entirely
conceivable, furthermore, that in some societies the act of conviction it-
self could represent an extremely stigmatizing event; in these societies,
the conviction rate might be stable. Perhaps appropriate assessments
through surveys in the different cultural settings would provide an indi-
cation of the most salient aspect of the punishment delivery process in
each society. We expect that this most salient dimension will also be the
dimension maintained at a stable rate. It is for this reason that we have
urged a variety of cross-cultural studies of these issues to explore the
differences in these homeostatic processes.
For the United States, we judged the ratio of average daily popula-
tion of prisoners per capita, reflecting not only commitments but also
time served, to be the most appropriate measure of punishment. The
saliency of time served is manifested in public expressions of concern
over sentence length and mandatory minimum sentences. There is also
considerable political debate over prison budgets, prison capacity, and
prison construction. These indicators of punishment policy concerns in
American society are certainly associated more with the question of
prison population than with commitments alone.
Despite Rauma's arguments for using commitments to prison as the
more appropriate measure of punishment, he discussed the United
States admissions data in considerably less detail than the incarceration
rate. The principal finding that emerges, however, is a time series very
similar to that of the incarceration rate, and both series seem quite ade-
quately to satisfy our less restrictive stability criteria.' 2 Furthermore,
10 Id at 1784-87.
" See Blumstein & Nagin, The Deterrent ect of Legal Sanctions on Draft Evasion, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 241 (1977).
12 Without the precise parameter estimates for Rauma's estimated first difference
autoregressive process of order one, we cannot assess the appropriateness of a second-order
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the similarity between admissions and prison populations indicates a
fairly constant average time served for people sentenced to prison. Once
again, Rauma's arguments rest on a distinction in form, but not in
substance.
The analysis of California over the time period 1835-1970 is inter-
esting, both because of the length of the series and because of the atten-
tion it is given in Rauma's paper. While we are somewhat disappointed
that Rauma failed to confirm our hypothesis, we would like the oppor-
tunity to review his data to see if there are minor modifications to his
formulation (as was the case for the United States time series) that
would be confirmatory. How much of his results, for example, are dic-
tated by the clearly turbulent, Gold Rush period of the 1850s. Also,
visual examination of the series suggests that Rauma should pay some
attention to the issue of periodicity in the time series, an issue which he
fails to address in any of his analyses of the time series. This is impor-
tant because a stable, periodic time series may appear non-stationary if
only particular segments are observed. Over the 1926-74 time period
examined in United States , 13 we found California to have a stationary but
periodic time series for its imprisonment rates, with a period in excess of
25 years. Rauma finds non-stationarity over the time period he exam-
ines. Although his time period is longer, it may well be that if he ex-
tends his data to 1979, the time series will appear stationary after all,
with extremely long cycles.
We estimated the California imprisonment rate series (1926-74) as a
stationary ARMA(1,1) process with parameter estimates j , =
.86(t=10.84) and 01 = -. 57(t= -4.37). These parameter estimates are
also within the stationarity and invertibility constraints. The general
structure of the equations for an ARMA(1,1) model and for the
IMA(1,1) model estimated by Rauma are very similar since:
ARMA(1,1): (1-( ,B)yt = (1-0 1 B)a, and
IMA(1,1): (l-B)yt = (1-0 1 B)a,.
An ARMA(1,1) model becomes an IMA(1,1) model when 4b = 1, which
is just outside the stationarity constraints of an ARMA model. As our
estimated value of 4 I of .86 is reasonably close to but still less than 1, it
is easy to see how this data could also be fit reasonably well by an IMA
model. Indeed, when we re-estimated our 1926-74 time series as an
IMA model, the resulting parameter estimate was 01 = -0.537. Once
again, however, the results for the IMA(1,1) model do not clearly domi-
autoregressive process on the admissions data. If those parameter estimates are of the same
order of magnitude as found for the incarceration rate, however, then despite Rauma's claims
to the contrary, the admissions data are also likely to be satisfactorily modeled as a stationary
second order autoregressive process.
13 Blumstein & Moitra, US Sates, supra note 2.
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nate those for the stationary ARMA(1, 1) model, and the choice between
the alternative models is a close call. The stationary ARMA(1, 1) model
is immediately consistent with the stability theory. Rauma's inclusion
of a trend parameter in the IMA(1,1) model he estimates indicates that
the California series is trendless and thus also consistent with the theory.
Thus, in terms of the stability of punishment hypothesis under test, the
choice between the models is not crucial, as both are consistent with the
theory.
In his discussion of the California series, Rauma makes much of our
Comment. 14 Cahalan 15 suggested a linear trend model based on nine
data points of incarceration rates from 1880 to 1970. While we argued
that "it is difficult to test definitively the model of so complex a process
as incarceration from data at only nine data points spaced over 90
years,"' 6 we did show that even those limited data, introduced to con-
tradict our theory, were explained better by a model consistent with our
theory-two constant incarceration rates with a shift from the lower to
the higher rate in about 1925 accompanying rapid changes in United
States society and in penological thinking. Rauma tries very hard to
find such a shift in the California data, and it is not terribly surprising
that he fails to find it. The nine data points merely suggest the possibil-
ity of such a shift, rather than definitively prove it-much more careful
analysis on a richer national data set is required to adequately address
that issue. Even if the shift did take place in the United States, however,
it is entirely conceivable that the major social changes that took place in
California over the past century would fail to mirror an aggregate
United States phenomenon, which was more likely to reflect the situa-
tion in the Northeast and the Midwest, where the bulk of the United
States population was then concentrated.
Furthermore, California is only one of the 47 states we analyzed.
While the stability hypothesis did not apply universally, 17 the theory did
seem to be broadly applicable. Rauma takes no notice of the fact that
the time series for Canada and Norway, both of which cover over 100
years, also support our theory. Certainly the weight of the evidence in
,these multiple replications in a variety of settings is on the side of "sta-
bility of punishment."
This discussion certainly raises a number of important issues re-
garding the formulation, testing, and validation of criminologic or so-
14 Blumstein & Moitra, Comment, supra note 2.
15 Cahalan, Trends in Incarceration in the United States &nce 1880, 25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
9 (1979).
16 Blumstein & Moitra, Comment, supra note 2, at 91.
17 A number of states-notably Nevada-were found to have trends, but the trends were
all small (all but Nevada trended less than 2 percent per year).
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cial-scientific theories. In the complex task of understanding the
behavior of individuals and of social organizations, it is extremely diffi-
cult to find regular patterns of behavior. When such patterns emerge in
particular settings, it becomes extremely important to find evidence of
the degree to which that behavior applies more generally. It is in that
spirit that we have formulated and successively tested the stability-of-
punishment concept. We fully acknowledge that the variables we have
identified need not be universally appropriate, and we expect that ex-
amples of jurisdictions can be found which behave in ways contrary to
our theoretical construct. While we almost certainly could find rational-
izations for those deviant jurisdictions, we feel that the process of devel-
oping insight is hindered rather than helped by using such
contradictions as a basis for rejecting, rather than modifying the basic
initial formulation.
All social theory is much too fragile to withstand rigid, mechanical
tests of universality. Failings of universality inevitably will occur, and
such observations should stimulate modification and revisions, or gener-
alization of the original theoretical construct. Much of our own re-
search has been stimulated by such a search for variation in formulation
and conceptualization. We were hoping that this sort of theory building
was Rauma's agenda also. Unfortunately, his agenda was much nar-
rower. Rather than introduce an alternative theoretical construct, he
has applied a data fitting methodology, and simply concludes that he
can fit the data better. We believe that we have shown even that con-
clusion to be mistaken. But more importantly, we want to emphasize
that even if he were right, the failure to suggest an alternative formula-
tion-or to attempt to resolve the differences in the empirical evi-
dence--contributes little to the process of theory development.
We believe the "stability of punishment" theory can be a useful
and potentially important contribution because it does appear to ex-
plain a considerable amount of the adaptive behavior within the crimi-
nal justice system and society generally. We believe, however, that it
should be subjected to many tests which will lead to modification and
revision. In this spirit, we were disappointed that Rauma's work failed
to seriously challenge the theory (despite the author's conclusions to the
contrary), or to propose useful alternatives or extensions. We hope fu-
ture efforts are more constructive.
We are surprised, for example, that no attention was paid to the
significant growth of 40 percent in the United States imprisonment rate
from 1971 to 1978.18 It is entirely possible that American society is be-




coming inherently more punitive, and is moving to a new, higher level
of "stable punishment." Alternatively, the increase in the 1970s might
reflect the demographic consequences of aging of the post-war baby
boom into the high-imprisonment ages. This is an issue we have ad-
dressed elsewhere. 19 This short-term trend could be a natural conse-
quence of a cyclical pattern in imprisonment rates that reached its low
point in 1969 and is now moving upward to maintain the long-term
stable mean. Another downward shift will identify the rise in the 1970s
as just the upward part of a cyclical process. Based on an analysis of
demographic shifts in Pennsylvania, we estimated this turn-around
would occur in about 1990.20
Another contributing factor to the growth in prison populations
could also be the emptying over the last decade of mental hospitals
under the impetus of psychopharmaceutical therapy and a policy of in-
voking the "least restrictive alternative" for the mentally ill. "Punish-
ment" could well include the involuntary confinement within mental
hospitals, 21 as well as in prison. Since many former mental patients get
involved with the criminal justice system after their release, accounting
for the transfer of inmates from mental hospitals to prison would dimin-
ish the magnitude of net increase in the level of punishment inferred
from considering imprisonment rates alone.
We hope some of Rauma's future work in this area pursues some of
these or related issues. We also intend to do so ourselves.
19 See Blumstein, Cohen & Miller, Demographically Disaggregated frjections of Prison Popula-
tions, 8 J. GRIM. JUST. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Prison Populations]; Blumstein, Cohen &
Miller, Crie, Punishment &Demographics, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct., 1980, at 32.
20 See Blumstein, Cohen & Miller, Prison Populations, supra note 19, at 19.
21 See Blumstein & Cohen, supra note 2, at 201.
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